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On June 14, 2013, Iran will again challenge its nation and nation-state.  The country will confront 
another presidential election—an event that four years ago became a national crisis, a social catastrophe, 
and a traumatic memory.1  
 
I have previously discussed the important role played by Iranian independent documentary 
filmmakers as well as urban journalists in the recording and representation of the traumatic events of the 
Iranian presidential crisis of 2009 (Khosronejad, 2009). However, much remains unsaid regarding the 
significance and function of the visual material and digital resistance art that was created and circulated 
on the Internet as a result of the national crisis. This collection is one of the first attempts to discuss the 
importance of visual resistance and protest art, its circulation via digital media, and its function in the 
peaceful movement that was transformed into one of the most traumatic events in the history of 
contemporary Iran.  
 
Following the official announcement of the Guardian Council of the Iranian government regarding 
the approval of four presidential candidates (Mahmud Ahmadinejad, Mehdi Karrubi, Mirhoseyn Mousavi 
and Mohsen Rezayi) for the Iranian election of 2009, major visual propaganda and media campaigns 
penetrated Iranian society.2 Before the election, Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, in a speech during Friday 
prayers, emphasized that the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) should collaborate closely with 
the four candidates to present their views and policies online for all Iranians. Following this request, for 
the first time in the history of postrevolutionary Iran, IRIB offered a special online program featuring 
debates among the candidates, who were allowed to describe their own political agendas and discuss their 
                                                 
1 This article was written a few weeks prior to the 2013 presidential election in Iran. Please note that all 
images in this article were retrieved from the Internet in 2009, but have since been removed. Thus there 
are no links provided for the images. 
2 For more information, watch the documentary The Real Fake. 
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opinions face-to-face, freely and openly. During previous presidential elections, IRIB had recorded 
candidate debates and, after censoring and editing them, broadcast them on national television, but it had 
not made them available online. 
 
IRIB’s online presentation of the debates greatly aided the peaceful public gatherings and the 
candidates’ campaign activities that took place in the streets of Iran up until June 11, 2009, one day 
before the election. All four candidates were allowed to campaign from their own propaganda offices and 
also in public places. Most such public activities consisted of peaceful demonstrations in which members of 
each group held posters, banners, flyers, and all sorts of propaganda paraphernalia in support of their own 
candidate or against the other groups. Here I should emphasize that only Ahmadinejad and Mousavi had 
serious campaign activities during the final two weeks before election day.  
 
During this time, the streets of Tehran turned to live blogs for peaceful communication between 
the members of each campaign; a spirit of cooperation and national cohesion could be seen everywhere. 
Prior to election day, there had been no reports of social aggression or political pressure related to the 
public activities in the streets, and no one could imagine that such a peaceful scene could suddenly 
become a national disaster.3 
 
On June 13, 2009, with the immature, irresponsible and unofficial interview of Mousavi regarding 
his gain in the presidential election,4 and the message of congratulations from IRIB (even before the 
official announcement of the Interior Minister) on the victory of Ahmadinejad,5 the peaceful process 
surrounding the presidential election and its public activities suddenly exploded. The situation became 
even worse when the new president, Ahmadinejad, invited his followers to gather in Valiasr Square in 
Tehran on June 14, 2009. It was there, during his speech, that Ahmadinejad publicly insulted Mousavi and 
his supporters, referring to them as “dust particles which are doing things in the corners.”6 By saying this, 
Ahmadinejad was declaring that Mousavi and his followers had no right to reject the result of the election. 
Moreover, IRIB, by broadcasting all of Ahmadinejad’s speeches a few times on the national channels, 
proved its alignment with the new president and made the situation even worse (for more information, 
see Khosronejad, 2009). 
 
From this moment on, public clashes during demonstrations and the destruction of public 
property became part of daily life in most Iranian cities, especially Tehran. Riot police and the secret 
service personnel secured the streets in the capital, in addition to suppressing those who rejected the 
results of the election. Representing the opposition, members of the Green Movement soon took to the 
streets to express their dissatisfaction. Little by little and day by day, what had been peaceful pre-election 
propaganda turned into antiregime slogans and protests against the Islamic government.  
                                                 
3 However, this does not mean that there was no verbal aggression among members of both groups. 
Indeed, closer to the date of the election, critical propaganda replaced the previously peaceful tone of 
slogans and critiques.  
4 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MPiy_BEmt7A 
5 Ahmadinejad, 62.63%; Mousavi, 33.75%; Rezayi, 10.73%; and Karrubi, .85%. 
6 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_UwM5ab-QfY 
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In response to Ahmadinejad’s gathering, on June 15, 2009, Mousavi and his followers arranged a 
massive public demonstration to protest the results of the election; this event turned into one of the most 
significant antiregime meetings of the postelection—or, more accurately, postrevolution—period in Iran. 
Azadi Square was selected as the gathering point, and thousands of Mousavi’s followers joined the 
demonstration. The views they expressed rapidly changed from statements of dissatisfaction with the 
election to antiregime sentiments and serious criticism of the activities and contributions of the Islamic 
Republic regarding Lebanon and Hezbollah in Gaza.7 For the first time, protests turned violent, with people 
in the street attacking a Bassij center; subsequent firearm exchanges between Bassijis and civilians 
resulted in many youths being killed on the streets of Tehran in the middle of the day.  
 
Following this tragedy, hidden governmental cameras, personal cellular phones, and CCTVs 
became increasingly important tools for capturing images of street events. Both sides used these devices, 
but employed them in two completely different ways.8 The regime and its secret service used the images 
to locate and arrest antiregime demonstrators, while demonstrators broadcast the images via Facebook, 
Twitter, Skype, and other online networks to inform the rest of the world about the activities going on in 
Iran (Khosronejad, 2009). In the absence of foreign media in Iran, especially after the presidential 
election period, urban journalism became one of the primary tools for allowing those in the West to follow 
internal events in the country.  
 
After the first week following the official announcement of the election results, the rhythm and 
purpose of public events and demonstrations changed completely. Ahmadinejad’s name disappeared from 
slogans, and the primary targets became the regime and its Supreme Leader (Press TV, 2010a). Clearly, 
the presidential election crisis had become a national predicament that could result in a regime change. In 
this regard, the most important demonstrations of the postelection period happened during Qods Day 
(September 18, 2009), Student Day (November 4, 2009), and the day of Ashura (December 27, 2009). 
 
 From June 15 to December 27, 2009, the streets of Tehran became the site of battles between 
supporters of the regime and its riot police on one side and supporters of Mousavi on the other. 
Unfortunately, during these urban conflicts, many civilians and innocent people were killed, imprisoned, or 
disappeared. Many others left the country out of fear of the regime.  
 
Western media groups tried to broadcast news they received from Iran in hopes of changing the 
regime. After enduring all of the political crises and social injustices, since 2009 the leaders of the Green 
Movement have been in enforced home exile, the mothers and families of the slain youths are in 
mourning, many citizens are in jail, and many others have left Iran. No one asks how Iran would be today 
if a leader of the Green Movement had been elected president in 2009.  
 
                                                 
7 The anti-Hezbollah slogans stemmed from the belief that the regime used Arab Hezbollah soldiers in the 
streets of Tehran as riot police against demonstrators.  
8 There also were strong debates among independent documentary filmmakers about what their role was 
during such a public crisis. For further information, see Khosronejad 2009. 
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Digital Resistance Art and Its Role in the Iranian  
Presidential Election Crisis of 2009 
 
The Iranian presidential election of 2009 provided an opportunity for artists inside and outside 
Iran to express their feelings and ideologies regarding this national crisis. Visual artists of all types—
graphic designers, painters, photographers, multimedia performers, and filmmakers—were engaged in the 
national resistance in different ways.9 Talented young artists created their own local workshops, and, 
alongside them, eminent artists dedicated their time, space, and energy to this movement. Perhaps the 
last time Iranian visual artists were engaged in national resistance activity at this level was 34 years ago, 
during the Iranian Revolution of 1978–1979. At that time, the technologies and materials used in the 
visual and performing arts were quite different than they are today, and therefore most of the visual 
propaganda and slogans were limited to handmade or silkscreened flyers, posters, and banners, as well as 
wall graffiti. During the Iranian Revolution, the main aim was to change the regime, and all groups worked 
to achieve this. However, it seems to me that these artists—especially those who were engaged in visual 
art—had ways of seeing and saying things that were quite different from the messages communicated by 
artists associated with the ideological parties. It is rare to find studies of the resistance and protest art 
that was created during the revolution in Iran. Visual artists at that time worked quite independently and 
were far removed from political groups or ideological factions. 10  
 
The more recent war between Iran and Iraq (1980–1988) completely changed the sphere of 
revolutionary and resistance art, turning it into war propaganda with new ideological slogans. Many of the 
artists involved in the visual art of the Iranian Revolution had returned to their normal artistic lives, and 
their work remained forever in their workshops.11 Instead, a new wave of revolutionary artists entered the 
market and created massive visual and propaganda art related to the imposed war with Iraq.12 However, 
the resistance art that was created during and after the presidential election crisis of 2009 is totally 
different from that associated with the Iranian revolution of 1978–1979. I think that the two most 
important points in this regard are (1) the nature of the resistance, and (2) digital technology and media 
communication. Digital art, cyberspace, and media communication greatly aided the creation, 
development, and circulation around the globe of messages about the Iranian resistance and, 
consequently, its art.13  
 
During the presidential election crisis of 2009 and especially in the postelection period, many 
resistance groups and demonstrators created online platforms, networks, and chat rooms through which 
they communicated within Iran. They soon understood, however, that one of the primary—and safest—
                                                 
9 More research is needed regarding the roles, activities, and decisions of each group of artists during that 
time.  
10 Here, I am talking about artists such as Morteza Momayez. 
11 Most of the mural paintings have also disappeared. For more information, watch Statues of Tehran 
(Kiarostami, 2008). 
12 Artists such as Naser Palangi, Iraj Eskandari, and Hoseyn Khosrojerdi. 
13 Of course, not all the visual art of the 2009 crisis was in digital form. For the role of media 
communication during that period, see Khosronejad (2009). 
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ways for such online networks and communities to transfer their messages and show their activities to the 
whole world was through cyberspace.  
 
Today, all around the world, activist networks and resistance communities are rapidly adopting 
new forms of digital tablets, sophisticated and multifunctional cellular phones, webcams, global positioning 
equipment, digital cameras, and a growing number of other digital and online technologies. “With a little 
creativity, these devices and media can provide new avenues of self-reporting, passive observation, and 
participant observation that yield valuable insights and new opportunities” (Masten & Plowman, 2003, p. 
7). for political groups and activists to transfer their messages to the world. Digital technologies, 
communication media, and, therefore, digital life and activities have become ubiquitous  
 
 A growing body of scholarship focuses in a more serious manner on the ways in which digital 
technologies fit within people’s daily practices—how such technologies are integrated within the practices 
that constitute communities (Wellman & Haythornthwaite, 2002), or how Internet-based technologies 
augment or remediate our sense of physical place (Walker, 2010). As Forte notes,  
 
The mainstream media’s privileged position of broadcast centrality in the control and 
direction of information has been, some might still argue, significantly eroded by the 
emergence of new media technologies, many-to-many communication, and narrow-
casting. If the printing press enabled or determined the creation and institution of 
nationalism, of the nation as an imagined community, then it is possible that the 
Internet, and specifically social media, is helping to bolster, if not create, new social 
movements and empowering diverse sections of civil society in their struggles against 
the state, against governments and corporations, and even against each other. (Forte, 
2010, para. 2) 
 
We thus witness a range of concerns in the literature about politics and power in/via the Internet, 
ranging from new utopian conceptualizations of a cyber-democracy to critiques of balkanization and 
fragmented associations to serious worries that social media are the best state surveillance tool yet, 
permitting heightened policing of citizens or even crowdsourcing intelligence for the cause of national 
security.14 Anyone can use social media to organize causes and project political messages, including states 
and their military and intelligence agencies—witness the techniques of soft power and genetically modified 
social movements (Forte, 2010). 
 
 Students of cultural media are also interested in observing the ways in which activists and 
political and resistance groups use such digital and online communication technologies for transferring 
their messages to the world. On this topic, MacWilliams (2005) states 
 
[F]or marginalized religious and political groups, the Internet is a powerful tool for 
informational and organizational purposes. As a communications medium available to 
anyone with a computer and modem, the Internet easily allows groups to explain who 
                                                 
14 The situation in Iran in 2009 is one the best examples in this regard. 
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they are, what they believe, and why they live the way they do. Since cyberspace is still 
relatively unrestricted by governmental regulations and monopolization by giant 
corporate media conglomerates, marginalized groups can take advantage of the 
internet’s open access for protest and resistance. On their websites, they are free to 
challenge the negative stereotypes about them that appear in the mainstream media, 
and to attack the perceived injustices against them by the powers that be. (MacWilliams, 
2005, p. 73) 
 
Such resistance websites illustrate the need to apply social theory about community to computer-
mediated communicative relationships. As cyber-sociologist Fernback (1999) posits, community is not 
simply a “materially determined, pre-existing physical reality” (p. 10) but a symbolic construct. 
Communities share not only actual places but also symbolic worlds in which any “object, act, event, 
quality, or relation can serve as vehicle of conception” (ibid.). Such sociocultural systems of symbols 
provide individuals with a sense of identity and meaning by semiotically representing their “common 
interests, values, economical livelihood, behaviors or roles” (ibid.). Computer-mediated communication is 
itself such a symbolic construct, one that is electronically reproduced in the non-place of cyberspace but is 
nonetheless a gathering place for a “community of meaning.” While people interacting online may be 
dislodged from their ordinary social relations in physical space, cyberspace provides them with a new, 
symbolically real, space in which to communicate and commune with each other (MacWilliams, 2005, p. 
75). In this regard, Juris (2005) suggests, such movements belong to a particular class of “computer-
supported social movements”.  
 
 Today, one of the main languages and mediums for such online resistance and digital activism is 
certainly digital resistance art. In this regard, one of the primary issues in this field of research is the 
connection(s) and relationship(s) among virtual art, cyberspace, and a subsequent digital aesthetic. 
Students of visual culture have demonstrated that the visual is inextricably linked to ongoing social, 
political, psychological, and cultural struggles (Duncum& Bracey, 2001, 2002; Freedman, 2001, 2003; 
Tavin, 2000, 2002). These struggles occur on numerous cultural fronts and through multiple media, 
including community celebrations, television programs, advertisements, and digital environments 
(Freedman & Schuler, 2002; Krug, 2002; Smith-Shank, 2002). According to visual culture theorist 
Mirzoeff, the human experience is now more visual and visualized than ever before, and visual culture is 
not only part of our everyday lives, it is our everyday lives. He explains that “visual culture directs our 
attention away from structured, formal viewing settings like the cinema and art gallery to the centrality of 
visual experience in everyday life” (Mirzoeff, 1999, p. 7). Duncum also has identified the everyday 
aesthetic experience as an often-overlooked but important location from which many of our attitudes and 
beliefs, and much of our knowledge, are shaped. He characterizes our everyday aesthetic experiences as 
significant sites where ideological struggles occur, often without our conscious knowledge, and argues that 
this imperceptibility makes them difficult to resist (Duncum, 1999, 2002). 
 
 Aesthetically speaking, as Popper notes, virtual art is the artistic interpretation of contemporary 
issues, not only with the aid of technological developments but also through their integration with them. 
Such an integration or combination allows for an aesthetic-technological logic of creation that forms the 
essential part of the specificity of the virtual artwork (Popper, 2006, pp. 1–2). As for the aesthetic 
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advances of virtual art, they are due to the potentialities given to individual artists to develop these 
techno-aesthetic categories in connection with plastic, narrative, sociopolitical, cultural, and still other 
issues. If the term “virtual” in this context involves a certain ambiguity because it is meant to play on a 
philosophical paradox between the virtual, the potential, and the actual (and even between the virtual and 
the real), this can only be considered an advantage of virtual aesthetics (Popper, 2006, p. 396). 
 
 According to Featherstone (2007), the aestheticization of everyday life refers to the rapid flow of 
signs and images that saturates the fabric of everyday life in contemporary society. A concern for 
everyday aesthetic arises from the societal turn toward the cultural and the simultaneous turn of the 
cultural toward the visual. This reflects both the very different sites of everyday culture and the diverse 
attitudes toward their experience. Condemned by some scholars for being superficial and self-referential, 
it is applauded by others for offering both immense pleasure and rich resources for the construction of 
identity (Duncum, 1999, p. 295). 
 
 For Khan, “the “political” and the “aesthetic” are antithetical concepts conflated in the expression 
“political aesthetic” (Khan, 2012, p. 1). The “political” is commonly associated with the immediate 
socioeconomic, that is, historical, reality: not only what we see and observe from a phenomenological 
perspective but also the dynamic distribution of space and time within which individuals associate into 
collectives, engaging in praxis, commitment, and the transformation of existing forces of production and 
their concomitant relations of production. In this regard, he argues that the “aesthetic” is understood in 
the Kantian sense as a “system of a priori forms of determining what presents itself in sense experience” 
(ibid.).  In other words, “aesthetic” is the realm of forms, the spiritual realm of ideas, of a priori categories 
that help us understand the sense perceptions of reality as it is (ibid.). 
 
 Resistance art and the political aesthetic that artists used in their work during the Iranian 
presidential election crisis of 2009 give us a unique opportunity to explore the ways in which cultural, 
visual, and political symbols—icons and allegories—united to create a new wave of visual activism in 21st-
century Iran. For more than 30 years, the Iranian regime was the official curator of all types of 
revolutionary, propaganda, and political visual art of the country, and the resistance artists of Iran’s 
presidential election crisis had only a few weeks in which to create and circulate their own art. It is very 
important to understand the ways in which visual artists were involved in political activities from the 
beginning of the presidential campaigns; to what extent they used icons, symbols, and aesthetics in their 
works; and how and with which mediums they presented their artwork. Also, it is quite astonishing to see 
that the peaceful political art of the pre-election period turned into digital resistance art with new political 
and activist messages that resulted in the use of new visual elements, symbols, and aesthetics in the 
postelection period. This collection is one of the first attempts to recognize this new wave of digital activist 




Our collection is a new and creative approach based on digital ethnography and netnography, 
which is the result of a call for papers I circulated in 2010. Based on the aims of the International Journal 
of Communication, we selected only three of the articles received. The combination of selected works 
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clearly demonstrates that our approach in this special section is based on interdisciplinary and 
pluridisciplinary methods. The first article of our collection was written by Elizabeth Rauh, a PhD candidate 
in the field of Islamic art history. The second article is the result of the research of Andrea Duranti, who 
holds a PhD in history, and our last article was written by Mazyar Lotfalian, a visual anthropologist.  
 
 In the first article, “Thirty Years Later: Iranian Visual Culture from the 1979 Revolution to the 
2009 Presidential Protests,” the author discusses the influence of Shiite visual symbols and slogans, which 
revolutionaries used in demonstrations during the Iranian Revolution of 1978–1979, on the visual and 
aesthetic codes and representations employed by resistance artists during the Iranian presidential election 
crisis of 2009.  
 
During this period—and mostly after the announcement of the results of the election—
demonstrators used flyers, banners, and posters on which different types of symbols, iconographies, and 
visual elements were represented. To this day, it is not known precisely who the creators of these works 
of art were; it is also difficult to determine whether these artists were located inside or outside of Iran 
during that period, but one might imagine that either scenario could be possible, given Iran’s situation in 
those days. However, it is quite clear that the artists developed their ideologies and, consequently, any 
related arts step-by-step and of course, based on the political era and emotional sphere of the 
postelection period.  
 
 Based on the political events and the situation of crisis during that period in Iran, one can classify 
the topic, content, and symbols used in the visual arts of the post–presidential election crisis in different 
ways; however, it seems to me that one of the best ways is perhaps to classify them based on a calendar 
of events.15  
 
 In this regard, the first category of protest artwork directly touches on the immediate 
dissatisfaction of the electorate concerning the results of the presidential election. In this category, and at 
the beginning of events, artists mostly used text and the color green in their works. At that stage, without 
interplay between text and image, no one could imagine that the demonstrators could transfer their 
messages of dissatisfaction. However, the interesting point in this period is that artists used both Persian 
and English typography for their slogans; clearly, they also wished to transfer their voices to the whole 
world.  
 
Certainly, the most utilized slogan in this category and during that period was, “Where is my 
vote?” It was only after a few days and based on public confrontations between peaceful demonstrators 
and the riot police that artists changed their texts gradually. Later they added more icons, such as a 
victory hand or a stylized bird, to their artwork. Also, in this stage one can feel aesthetically that artists 
would increasingly replace standard visual propaganda symbols with allegorical icons.  
 
                                                 
15 For a more coherent calendar of events related to this topic, see  
http://www.greens-art.net/events/?lang=en  
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 From the beginning of the demonstrations of the pre-election period, the followers of Mousavi 
chose the color green for their campaign—their leader is among the descendants of the Prophet (a 
Seyyed), and the color green is a sign of the holiness of the Ahl-e Beyt (the Household of the Prophet) in 
Shiite iconology and symbolism.  
 
 However, before the period of the election, the use of this color had no further symbolic or 
political meaning for this group of voters. With the announcement of the election results and the 
dissatisfaction among Iranians, the symbolic and aesthetic meaning of the color green changed from an 
indication of a member of the Holy Family (a Seyyed) to the greater and more general message of 
freedom.  
 
 Also, it was after the public aggression and harsh confrontations between demonstrators and riot 
police, which resulted in public beatings and the death of civilians, that resistance artists added more 
symbolic elements to their works. Soon, the colors red and black found their place in visual resistance art, 
signifying aggression and death; these two symbolic colors also automatically direct every viewer to one 
of the main routes of Iranian Shiism, martyrdom. The nature and content—and therefore visual elements 
and symbols—of the peaceful propaganda arts of the pre-election period had changed into a political art of 
resistance.  
 














As mentioned earlier, it was only two days after the official announcement of the election results 
and the speeches of Ahmadinejad that the manifestations changed from peaceful demonstrations into 
bloody public aggressions. Consequently, many of the demonstrators were disappeared, killed, or jailed. 
At this stage, artists added a new and powerful symbol to their art: an open hand (panjeh). The victory 
hand ceded to the panjeh. A sociopolitical visual icon, though not necessarily an Iranian one, ceded its 
place to a powerful and important Shiite symbol that could be considered somehow Iranian. The 
demonstrations to reclaim the lost votes changed into a fight against tyranny and oppression. It is at this 
stage that Rauh’s article provides us with a detailed explanation of the new wave of symbols and visual 
aesthetics that, according to her, are related to the Karbala paradigm, the Iranian Revolution of 1978–
1979, and the Green Movement.  
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 Based on eyewitness accounts and oral reports, around 72 young demonstrators lost their lives in 
Tehran alone between June 15 and July 17, 2009.16 However, for many reasons, one individual has 
become the icon of those who were killed during this public crisis: Neda Agha Soltan. On June 20, 2009, 
Neda Agha Soltan, one of the many innocent citizens who was in the streets participating in 
demonstrations, or simply, like many others, just observing events, was shot dead. In less than half a 
day, footage of Neda’s death, which many consider to be one of the most shocking and powerful images of 
our century, was circulated on the Internet.  
 
 The brutal sight of a young civilian girl dying in front of us, with open eyes—and the recording of 
these moments and the transmitting of them to the world—brought the Iranian regime a new political and 
media crisis. The ambiguous circumstances surrounding Neda’s death provided another opportunity for 
many political groups inside, but especially outside, Iran to use and abuse this topic against the regime. 
World reaction and response to footage of Neda’s death encouraged Iranian citizens to share on the 
Internet additional photos and footage (tekey-e film) of the daily crisis in the streets of Tehran. And, 
increasingly, the Iranian regime tried to ignore or reject the truth in its communications (Khosronejad, 
2012). 
 
 Andrea Duranti, in his article, provides detailed information about Neda Agha Soltan, her life, how 
she became one of the icons of the Iranian presidential crisis of 2009, and the ways in which foreign 
media used and reused her story to condemn the Iranian regime. Although Neda’s sudden, impious death 
left a strong mark on all of the artists who were involved in the resistance art of the presidential election 
crisis, many mysteries and unanswered questions about her death remain.  
 
 Again, based on a calendar of the events, hours and days following Neda’s death, visual 
representations of her changed and developed. The first image of her death was short, simple, but 
extremely violent footage that was recorded by an anonymous member of the public on the street.17 
During the first hours after the circulation of the footage on the Internet, the regime tried to reject this 
horrifying news; they immediately circulated a photo portrait of a woman whose name is close to that of 
Neda Agha Soltan (Schraven, 2009). The regime’s justification was that what the demonstrators were 
saying was false and that the death of Neda was staged in order to accuse the system of being responsible 
for her death (Press TV, 2010b). 
 
 Therefore, the first series of images created by artists of the movement in memory of Neda was 
based on the photo portrait of the second Neda, not the real Neda Agha Soltan. However, this moment 
was very important, in part because visual artists’ generalized use of photo portraits of the dead young 
demonstrators began from this moment. Also, it demonstrates that Neda’s death shocked the whole world 
to that point that artists used an image of another woman without knowing that she was not the real 
Neda, simply in order to defend Neda’s rights.  
 
                                                 
16 See http://www.peykeiran.com/Content.aspx?ID=6167  
17 Additional footage posted on the Internet only a few weeks after Neda’s death shows the person filming 
the primary footage of her death.  
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At the same time, urban journalism gained another dimension and became more important. Even 
before the election, demonstrators had begun to use their cellular phones to capture images of public 
events and circulate them on the Internet, but footage of Neda’s death gave more breadth and value to 
urban journalism and the usage of digital images and arts (for more information on this topic, see 
Khosronejad 2009). Simultaneously, the engagement of foreign demonstrators outside Iran also changed. 
Very soon, personal and family photos of the genuine Neda Agha Soltan were circulated on the Internet, 














The next group of works comprises digital images focused on the portrait of Neda, stylizing it as 
graphic image with English anecdotes. In these graphic images, which were primarily circulated among 
social networks, online groups, and also on the Internet, the color red was dominant; most of the texts 
say, “We will never forget” or “Neda, stay with us.”18  
 
 















                                                 
18 This second slogan comes from the voice that can be heard in the footage of Neda’s death.  
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A few days later, the immediate shock of Neda’s death (an unjustified human death) was 
integrated into the rest of the general resistance activities, including the visual arts of the postelection 
period (a martyr for the Green Movement). At this stage, the series of digital works of art became more 
stylized, and the use of color became more important. The color black was quite dominant (the symbol of 
death), while red was well placed (people were still dying) and, little by little, green again found its place 
(they belonged to the Green Movement).  
 
 In these digital resistance works, the messages of the texts also changed. Using the name of 
Neda (meaning “whisper of freedom” in Persian) directly was abandoned in favor of invocations with a 
metaphorical meaning of her name—phrases such as “Neda, the divine calling” or “support for freedom for 
Iran”—to more closely coincide with the aims of the Green Movement. Clearly, in these series of digital 
artwork, artists used strong images of Neda’s portrait, which is covered by her blood in the last moments 
of her life, a sign that “the price of freedom is death.”  
 


























In subsequent images, Neda became the main “voice of freedom” even for those in the diaspora, 
including non-Iranians. At this stage, artists symbolically used the map and flag of Iran, the country’s 
typography, the color green, and the portrait of Neda together.  
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Another category of digital artwork about Neda’s death is a group of works that use the symbol of 
the heart (qalb) in Persian, which internationally signifies love but also symbolizes the death of Neda, who 
was killed by a shot to the heart when she became the target of snipers. The message of this group of 
works is “Neda, you will ‘stay forever in our soul.’”19 Generally speaking, it is quite difficult to ascertain 








                                                 
19 Last but not least, we should discuss the objects and paraphernalia that were created in Neda’s 
memory, mostly outside Iran and among the Iranians of the diaspora. These gradually surfaced in the 
year following Neda’s death. For more information, see Khosronejad, 2012. 

























With the death of Neda and other young protesters in the streets of Tehran, as I argued, the role 
of urban journalism and, consequently, the engagement of international demonstrators and foreign news 
agencies became much more important to the events in Iran. In those days, it was quite difficult to 
disbelieve the foreign news that was broadcast about the internal conditions of Iran.20 At the same time, 
with the development of urban journalism, online social networks and activist communities became crucial 
in the internal affairs of the presidential election crisis. As a consequence, the involvement of online artists 
and their digital resistance art again gained other dimensions.  
                                                 
20 Many of them, such as BBC Persian and CNN, broadcast inaccurate information and false audio 
interviews.  
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The third article of our section, written by Mazyar Lotfalian, discusses the role of visual culture 
and digital practices during this period. Lotfalian is in agreement with others that short footage captured 
by cellular phones in the streets of Tehran became the primary visual sources for many others to create 
short clips, animations, and other types of multimedia. If we cannot determine with certainty who the 
visual digital artists of the Iranian presidential crisis were, especially during the first week after the 
announcement of the election results, from the second week we can definitely say that the creation and 
circulation of multimedia artwork on the Internet were the result of those resistance artists who were 
living outside of Iran. It is hard to imagine, given the restrictions and difficulties that the regime placed on 
the Internet and its use in Iran, especially after the announcement of the presidential election results, that 
artists living in Iran could circulate such artwork online.  
 
 In his article, Lotfalian demonstrates that resistance artists who lived outside Iran were inspired 
by the visual elements and symbols that were used during the Iranian Revolution of 1978–1979. The 
author also argues that the notion of circulation that is discussed in debates about new media and theories 
of representation is not strong enough to account for the impacts and effects of such digital resistance art 
on the public sphere. Instead, he proposes the use of new forms of social practice that are based on the 
convergence of modes of production.  
 
International Journal of Communication 7 (2013)  Editorial Introduction 1313 
 As Duncum notes, net art is not really art at all, but rather an emerging complex of network-
mediated image manipulations for which we have no better set of constructs to describe than the 
multiplex of pre-existing social models regarding art that exist generally in contemporary society (as cited 
in Stalbaum, 1998, p. 18). It is perhaps in this realm that the digital resistance art from the Iranian 
presidential election crisis can become politically relevant. It can contribute to discussions about the 
nature of social and political threats and their impact on Iranian activist communities and youth resistance 
groups; about the memory and trauma of those who lost their children and loved ones in the public crisis 
after the presidential election period; and future policies about the fundamental definition of security and 
the ensuing relationship between inside and outside. Such digital protest mediums stress the importance 
of art in the process of “coming to terms with what has happened” and in the “healing, recovery and 
rebuilding of self and community” (Bleiker 2006, p. 84). They seek to “function as a dialogue for those 
who wish to communicate through images” (ibid.) and to open up avenues of discussion and expression 
through cultural intervention. 
 
 If we consider our collection as one of the first attempts to examine the role of digital resistance 
art in the Middle East and Islamic communities, we still have a long way to go in learning about this type 
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